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Animal Pharmaceuticals
UNDEFINED TURF
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates animal drugs under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, while the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) regulates 
animal biologicals under the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act. But the question of 
which agency has jurisdiction to regulate a given animal health product is not 
always a totally obvious one. The regulatory definition of a biological is in 
need of updating to clarify the status of some of the compounds being devel-
oped through biotechnology. Particularly difficult to classify are those com-
pounds which occur endogenously, modulate the immune response and have 
pharmacological properties. A classic example of this sort of regulatory am-
biguity can be seen in the handling of the interferons which are regulated as 
biologicals (by FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research) for hu-
man use, but are regulated as drugs (by FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine) 
when labeled for use in animals. This disparity has more to do with inter-
agency politics than it does with the pharmacological/immunomodulatory 
effects of interferons. The Animal Health Institute (AHI) is currently work-
ing on a proposal to amend the regulatory definition of a biological, with 
the object of providing a more adequate taxonomy of drugs vs biologicals— 
which would ipso facto determine which agency should have jurisdiction to 
regulate a given substance or product.
PRODUCT VS PROCESS AND THE GLASS FOURTH HURDLE
A cornerstone of the final “Scope” policy statement of the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy as published in the Federal Register, February 27,1992, 
is the notion that regulatory oversight is appropriately applied in direct pro-
portion to the risk associated with a given product per se, independent of the 
technology employed in the manufacturing process. Interestingly, neither ob-
jective product risk assessment nor concern with the nature of the manufac-
turing process has occupied center stage in the controversy surrounding bo-
vine somatotropin (BST), the first high-profile product of biotechnology to 
be developed as an animal drug.
Since FDA finished its food safety evaluation of BST in 1986 and pro-
nounced that there were no human food safety issues arising from the
use of BST in lactating dairy cattle (Juskevich and Guyer, 1990), the public 
debate has focused on possible economic and social effects of the anticipated 
widespread adoption of the use of BST by the dairy industry. Questions have 
been raised and projections made as to the magnitude of the effects of wide-
spread BST use on volume of milk production, milk prices, dairy herd size 
and the continued viability of marginal, inefficient dairy operations.
FDA cannot legally take such socioeconomic considerations into ac-
count in the premarket drug approval process; animal drugs must be evalu-
ated on the basis of the objective criteria of safety and efficacy. However, FDA 
does not operate in a political vacuum and in a situation where heated politi-
cal debates on the socioeconomic aspects of a new animal drug run concur-
rently with the regulatory evaluation of the drug, it is hard to believe that the 
agency would not be affected to some degree in its deliberations on the drug. 
At the very least, the political heat radiating from the socioeconomic issues 
can be seen to make the agency even more cautious than usual in its evalua-
tion of the safety and efficacy data on the drug—which would logically result 
in a delay in the approval process.
Moreover, while the effects of socioeconomic criteria on the regulatory 
process may be subtle and unofficial at the federal level, they can be blatant 
and most official at the state level, as evidenced by the current legislative 
moratorium on the use of BST in Maine.
DOORS VS WINDOWS
Another issue which is by no means unique to biotechnology products, but 
158 which, as a matter of historical fact, emerged as the subject of public contro-
versy in the course of the ongoing BST debate, is that of regulatory transpar-
ency. In 1986 in the UK, headlines appeared about “secret trials” being con-
ducted with BST on undisclosed farms, with innuendoes of collusion be-
tween the animal health companies and the British Ministry of Agriculture. 
What, in fact, was happening was that animal health companies were field- 
testing a product for efficacy—the human food safety of the product having 
already been established to the satisfaction of the regulatory authorities—in 
accordance with the pertinent regulations, in exactly the same way as hun-
dreds of other animal health products had been tested previously. The brou-
haha arose, not because BST was receiving any favored treatment by the Brit-
ish government—that was clearly not the case—but rather because the public 
was totally unaware of the regulations and legal procedures routinely used in 
the testing and approval of animal drugs—until the BST critics sought to 
portray those procedures as some sort of conspiracy against the public.
At the heart of the transparency issue is a conflict between the public’s 
“right-to-know” and a drug sponsor’s legal right to confidential treatment 
of proprietary information on a product including the details of the tests 
conducted to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the product in the regu-
latory approval process.
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In the U.S., the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides that data which 
are submitted on a new animal drug by the drug sponsor will be evaluated 
on a confidential basis by FDA. The first regulatory hurdle which must be 
cleared in the drug approval process is that of establishing human food 
safety. Only when a new animal drug has been sufficiently evaluated and 
found to be safe from the point of view of humans consuming food produced 
by animals treated with the drug, may FDA approve an Investigational New 
Animal Drug Application (INADA) which authorizes the drug sponsor to 
conduct tests to demonstrate the efficacy and target animal safety of the drug.
In the FDA-monitored field trials conducted under an INADA, the issue of 
the safety of the food derived from the test animals has already been resolved 
by FDA. Thus, in terms of human food safety the drug is no longer an “ex-
perimental drug.” At the INADA stage, a drug is actually “experimental” only 
in regard to its efficacy and its safety to the target animal at dosages intended 
for commercial use. The food produced by the animals involved in such test-
ing is as safe as any other food produced with fully approved new animal 
drugs. Claims that the public is being put in jeopardy through exposure to 
food produced with an “experimental (INADA) drug” are ill-founded, and usu-
ally mischievous.
Yet there is a point of view which says that even if FDA says a product or 
technology is safe, the public has a right to know whether the food in com-
mercial channels was produced with that product or technology. Here the 
question of labeling rears its head and labeling is a highly controversial issue.
In principle, no one should object to providing the consumer with as 
much objective, nonproprietary information about food products as the con- 159
sumer has patience to read. However, in the reality of commercial food pro-
duction and marketing there are some difficulties involved in routinely pro-
viding certain types of information on the label of a food product. Let us 
consider, for example, the very topical notion of positively labeling a food 
product with something like: “Produced with xenophobein, a hormone de-
rived from recombinant DNA technology.” Let us say that this imaginary 
protein called “xenophobein” has been found by FDA to pass all the rigorous 
regulatory tests for human food safety and that food produced with xeno-
phobein is analytically identical to food produced with traditional technolo-
gies. In such a case, what are the consequences of putting the above-quoted 
information on the label of food produced with xenophobein? Four come 
immediately to mind:
1. Such labeling contributes nothing to the consumer’s knowledge in 
terms of safety or nutritional information, given that there is no objective 
difference between food produced with xenophobein and food produced 
without it. So, in a scientific sense, such labeling is gratuitous and of no con-
sequence.
2. To insist on detailed labeling as to the technology by which a food is 
produced when the food itself has been found by FDA to be safe, is essentially
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to discount FDA’s safety evaluation process. If we accede to demands that 
consumers should be given the opportunity to make their own safety assess-
ment (presumably on the basis of data purveyed by such prestigious scientific 
journals as The Wall Street Journal), the logical conclusion is that product la-
beling should be sufficient to allow consumers to protect themselves through 
the exercise of “informed” choice. But in that case FDA’s evaluation would be, 
at best, redundant and, at worst, in disagreement with the consumer’s per-
sonal evaluation. We could just as well dispense with the services of FDA and 
revert to a system of exhaustive labeling and caveat emptor.
It seems to me that, for all FDA’s imperfections.—and AHI is traditionally 
one of FDA’s most vocal critics—we as a society are better off with a govern-
ment-run agency making regulatory decisions on the basis of expert scien-
tific evaluation, than we would be in a system of “every man [sic] his own 
regulator,” where some would demand that an encyclopedia of product infor-
mation and manufacturing data be attached to each can of pork ‘n beans and 
the role of the agency would be reduced to that of an editor of encyclopedias.
3. As my colleagues in the European Commission learned when they 
proposed positive labeling of beef produced with hormones as a solution to 
the European hormone debate in the midi 980s, the use of emotive terms like 
“hormone” in labeling is likely to scare, rather than objectively inform, con-
sumers. (That, of course, is exactly the effect desired by many who advocate 
such labeling, as their interest is not in accurately informing consumers, but 
rather in politically motivating consumers through the manipulative use of 
“hot” language which serves to obfuscate rather than to educate.) Even with 
the best of intentions, what is intended as a neutral statement of fact on a la-
bel can be all too easily misinterpreted as a warning.
4. Labels generally are, of necessity, minor masterpieces of succinctness. 
Space on a label is available only at a cost and any statement that did not convey 
concrete information as to the safety or nutritional value of the contents of a 
food package would carry uncompensated added costs which would increase the 
cost of the product to the consumer without providing a benefit. I
I would emphasize that the above considerations apply only to positive 
labeling, e.g., “This product was produced with xenophobein.” There are no 
such objections to negative labeling, e.g., “This product was produced with-
out xenophobein.”Though the fact remains that the product produced with-
out xenophobein is identical to that produced with xenophobein—and there-
fore the negative labeling is scientifically as meaningless as positive labeling 
would be—the option of negative labeling allows consumers to exercise 
choice in the process by which their food is produced.
Negative labeling has the advantage of being equitable to all parties in-
volved in food production and consumption. If there is sufficient demand
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for a product produced by an “alternative” (which generally means low-tech, 
high-cost) technology—i.e., if producers find that it is commercially viable 
to exploit a niche market based on a perceived consumer preference for food 
produced without the use of a “mainstream” (generally high-tech, low-cost) 
technology—then by all means “let a thousand flowers bloom” in the market-
place. Let consumers decide with their checkbooks which products best sat-
isfy individual preferences—whether those preferences be based on cost, 
safety, nutritional quality, aesthetics, ideology, or a combination of factors. 
Let producers decide which markets they want to cater to, matching produc-
tion technologies with consumer preferences—as determined by the extent 
to which consumers are in fact willing to pay premium prices for products 
produced with the less efficient technologies.
COMMERCIAL PROMOTION VS POLITICAL SELF-DEFENSE 
Of current concern in the regulation of animal pharmaceuticals—and of par-
ticular relevance to those derived from biotechnology—is the issue of pre-
approval “promotion” or defense of a product by the manufacturer while the 
product is still under evaluation by PDA. The agency has defined “promo-
tion” so broadly as to impose very narrow limitations on the information 
that can legally be conveyed to the public by a manufacturer about a product 
in the pre-approval phase. The AHI has taken a quite different position on 
what kinds of activities constitute commercial promotion—as opposed to the 
pre-approval defense of a product in response to political attacks intended to 
prevent its approval.
The AHI view is that the severe limitations on the dissemination of in-
formation which FDA has sought to impose on AHI and its members are not 
dictated by the relevant regulations, are inconsistent with Administration 
policies to remove impediments to the development of new technologies and 
are seriously at odds with AHI’s and its members’ constitutionally protected 
rights to protect their property interests fully in the political arena. Negoti-
ations are underway to attempt to resolve this dispute which has far-reaching 
implications for the application of biotechnology in animal agriculture.
IMPEDIMENTS TO DRUG APPROVAL VS THE THREAT OF SNAKE OIL
The last issue I would like to touch on, namely, the need to revisit the statu-
tory efficacy standard for animal drugs, is in a sense a by-product of the cur-
rent debate on extra-label drug use. It is not unique to biotechnology prod-
ucts, but it has coincidentally arisen as a major regulatory issue at the time 
when the first biotechnologically produced animal drugs are in the latter 
stages of the FDA approval process—which is to say, at the time when these 
biotechnology products are undergoing efficacy testing.
The efficacy standard for animal drugs, as set forth in the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act, is relatively simple and straightforward. In ordinary lan-
guage, FDA must require “substantial evidence” that a product is effective
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for the purpose for which it is intended, i.e., an animal drug cannot be ap-
proved by FDA until it has been shown not to be “snake oil.” The “substantial 
evidence” required is ordinarily in the form of “adequate and well-controlled 
studies.”
Unfortunately, this reasonable, bare-bones efficacy standard as set forth 
in the statute has undergone a sea-change of agency interpretation over the 
last few decades. Regulatory barnacles and mineral accretions have built up 
in the form of ever-more-complex policies for efficacy testing requirements. 
The problem has now reached such proportions that it often costs more for 
an animal drug sponsor to conduct the efficacy studies required for FDA ap-
proval than it does to conduct the safety studies which have traditionally ac-
counted for the major portion of the cost of product development.
Particularly onerous to sponsors seeking regulatory approval of new ani-
mal drugs is FDA’s current policy to require “optimal dose” titration studies, 
in which a number of doses (the majority of them irrelevant to clinical real-
ity) are tested for efficacy, in order to determine the lowest dose which is ad-
equately effective. Clearly this requirement adds greatly, and unnecessarily, 
to the cost and time required to get a drug approved. But it also has the addi-
tional long-term disadvantage of freezing the label dose at a level which may 
itself be clinically irrelevant by the time the drug has been used in the field 
for a few years. (For a good example of the latter problem, consider penicillin 
which is now universally acknowledged to be virtually useless in veterinary 
medicine at levels less than three times the once “optimal” dose which is still 
the only dose on the product label.)
To address these problems, AF1I and the American Veterinary Medical 
Association (AVMA) have filed a Citizen Petition proposing that FDA ap-
prove dosage ranges and eliminate the requirement for optimal dose titration 
in efficacy testing. The proposal applies only to new animal drugs which have 
adequate safety data packages and which would be restricted to use by or on 
the order of a licensed veterinarian. The statutory deadline for FDA to re-
spond to the Citizen Petition passed silently several weeks ago. In light of the 
recently launched AVMA legislative initiative to legalize extra-label drug use 
by veterinarians, this silence on FDA’s part could be pivotal. If FDA is per-
ceived as being unable to respond positively to proposals submitted in a reg-
ulatory mode to streamline current policies on efficacy testing, that would 
surely be interpreted by some in the industry as an indication that legislation 
is the only available remedy.
Regardless of whether it is eventually achieved through regulatory chan-
nels or through Congress, streamlining the efficacy testing requirements for 
animal drugs has clear advantages. It would free up agency resources to de-
vote to the crucial process of safety evaluation of new animal drugs. It would 
remove a major economic disincentive that currently discourages drug spon-
sors from seeking broader label indications for new drugs. And it would have 
a positive impact on the rate of approval of new animal drugs (including bio-
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technology products) which would mitigate the crisis in drug availability 
which currently besets animal agriculture.
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